Heed Neglect, Disrupt Child Maltreatment

Lindsey Bullinger (Georgia Tech)
Meg Feely (University of Connecticut)
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37%



Short Term

Attachment Problems

Cognitive Development

Social Functioning

Depression & Behavioral Problems

Worse Health

Unemployment & Poverty

Use of Social Services

Crime

Long Term

$428

billion

75%

neglect



Note: Trend estimates represent total change from 1992 to 2016. Annual rates for physical abuse and sexual abuse have been multiplied by 2 and 3 respectively in Figure 1 so that trend comparisons can be highlighted.

Childhood Fatality Rates from 1970-2016, By Cause of Death



Data are from Vital Statistics and the Children Bureau's Child Maltreatment Reports.
Rates are per 100,000 children in each age group except congenital malformations where deaths are per 1,000 live births.

HOW?

1. Clearly identifying the fatality outcome

2. Understanding the mechanisms that lead to the cause-specific mortality

3. Implementing macro-level policies and campaigns to change behaviors

MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT FATALITIES

1. Riding *in* vehicles was clearly identified. Goal became reduce MV accidents by making *all* driving safer (i.e., universal prevention involves everyone driving the speed limit, not just those identified as unsafe).

2. Research determined the primary factors in MV fatalities.



3. Advocates identified interventions (e.g., requiring car/booster seats, passing graduate drivers licensing policies, enacting speed limits, enforcing law affecting impaired driving BAC laws, minimum legal drinking age laws, zero tolerance laws, higher alcohol taxes). Awareness campaigns. Manufacturers improved safety of vehicles.

“Reducing neglect is challenging because it seems to be the result of complex and unidentified interactions that our current health and social services systems do not effectively prevent.”


Neglect
Physical Abuse
Emotional Abuse
Sexual Abuse
0
10
20
30
40
50
Low SES
High SES

“Neglect is not necessarily the result of intentional behaviors that can be influenced or easily changed, especially if larger macro-level factors are at play that suppress the family’s ability to promote child well-being.”

What causes neglect?

“If we accept that poverty is a causal factor in the perpetration of neglect, we can begin to reduce neglect (and its consequences) long before the exact mechanisms are understood.”

Feely, Raissian, Schneider, & Bullinger (2021)

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The Social Welfare Policy Landscape and Child Protective Services: Opportunities for and Barriers to Creating Systems Synergy

Megan Feely, Kerri M. Raissian, William Schneider, Lindsey Rose Bullinger

First Published January 29, 2021 | Research Article | Check for updates
https://doi.org/10.1177/0002716220973566

Feely, Raissian, Schneider, & Bullinger (2020)

Time & Money



Feely, Raissian, Schneider, & Bullinger (2020)

Time & Money

Macro-level factors & systems synergy



Feely, Raissian, Schneider, & Bullinger (2020)

Time & Money

Macro-level factors & systems synergy

Child neglect = unemployment rate



SOME EXAMPLES


Neglect
Physical Abuse
Emotional Abuse
Sexual Abuse
0
40
50
Low SES
gh SES

“The typical minimum wage earner is a provider and a breadwinner—most likely a woman—responsible for paying bills, running a household and raising children.”

--Thomas Perez, United States Secretary of Labor (2014)



Substantial Overlap

Cancian, Yang, & Slack (2013)

Social Service Review > Volume 87, Number 3

NEXT ARTICLE

The Effect of Additional Child Support Income on the Risk of Child Maltreatment

Maria Cancian, Mi-Youn Yang, and Kristen Shook Slack

University of Wisconsin–MadisonLouisiana State UniversityUniversity of Wisconsin–Madison

Cancian, Yang, & Slack (2013)

TABLE 2. Odds Ratios from Logistic Regression Models Predicting Screened in Child Maltreatment Reports

	Models		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Experimental group	.892**	.879**	.881**
	(.048)	(.048)	(.050)

$100 per year reduced screened-in reports by 2 percentage points (10%).

Raissian & Bullinger (2017)

Children and Youth Services Review 72 (2017) 60–70

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Children and Youth Services Review

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/childyouth

Money matters: Does the minimum wage affect child maltreatment rates?

Kerri M. Raissian [a,*], Lindsey Rose Bullinger [b]

Raissian & Bullinger (2017)

	Report rate	Neglect rate	Physical abuse rate	Other abuse rate	Substantiation rate	Removal rate
All children						
Minimum wage (2005 $)	−93.39^{+}	−68.44**	−15.47	−11.13	−12.37	−1.267
	−55.31	−28.3	−10.69	−21.25	−13.83	−3.762
Effect size	−8.76%	−9.61%	−6.01%	−3.74%	−4.92%	−1.78%
Average dependent variable	1066	712	257	298	251	71

$1 increase in MW reduces neglect reports by 10%

Berger et al. (2017)

Income and child maltreatment in unmarried families: evidence from the earned income tax credit

Lawrence M. Berger ✉, Sarah A. Font, Kristen S. Slack & Jane Waldfogel

Review of Economics of the Household **15**, 1345–1372 (2017) | Cite this article

Berger et al. (2017)

	Abuse	Neglect	CPS Investigation
Single-mother families (2,581 observations of 1,127 families)			
Percent	35.34	37.97	7.59
Model 3: All controls	–0.0069	–0.0122*	–0.0058*
(income estimate presented)	(0.0048)	(0.0049)	(0.0025)
F-statistic (first stage)	194.72	194.72	194.72
Model 4: Add state fixed effects	–0.0048	–0.0124*	–0.0058*
(income estimate presented)	(0.0049)	(0.0050)	(0.0026)
F-statistic (first stage)	186.07	186.07	186.07
Model 5: With family fixed effects	0.0050	–0.0103†	–0.0070†
(income estimate presented)	(0.0056)	(0.0062)	(0.0038)
F-statistic (first stage)	138.65	138.65	138.65

Increase in income from EITC of $1,000 reduced CPS involvement by 7-10%.

Kovski et al. (2021)

Association of State-Level Earned Income Tax Credits With Rates of Reported Child Maltreatment, 2004–2017

Nicole L. Kovski, Heather D. Hill, Stephen J. Mooney, Frederick P. Rivara, Erin R. Morgan, Ali Rowhani-Rahbar

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First Published January 19, 2021 | Research Article | Find in PubMed | Check for updates

https://doi.org/10.1177/1077559520987302

Kovski et al. (2021)

	Overall Reports	Neglect Reports	Physical Abuse Reports	Emotional Abuse Reports	Sexual Abuse Reports	Overall Substantiations
All Children	−220 (−455, 15) *	−241 (−449, −33) **	−21 (−58, 16)	−32 (−106, 42)	6 (−16, 28)	−55 (−120, 10) *
By Child Age						
Ages 0–5	−276 (−563, 9) *	−324 (−582, −65) **	−22 (−69, 25)	−49 (−139, 41)	6 (−21, 33)	−89 (−179, 1) *
Ages 6–17	−194 (−403, 16) *	−201 (−387, −15) **	−19 (−50, 12)	−25 (−91, 42)	5 (−15, 25)	−40 (−95, 15)
N	689	689	689	658	689	689

10 % pt increase in state EITC reduced neglect reports by 10%

Biehl & Hill (2018)

Foster care and the earned income tax credit

Amelia M. Biehl & Brian Hill

Review of Economics of the Household **16**, 661–680 (2018) | Cite this article

Biehl & Hill (2018)

	Entry	Entry
State EITC * Federal expansion	−0.286**	−0.293***
	(0.134)	(0.075)
State and year fixed effects	X	X
Full set of control variables		X
Sample: Always SEITC and Never SEITC states		
Observations	420	420

EITC expansion from ARRA2009 (~$1,000) reduced foster care entry by 7.5%

Schneider, Bullinger, & Raissian (2021)

How does the minimum wage affect child maltreatment and parenting behaviors? An analysis of the mechanisms

William Schneider, Lindsey Rose Bullinger & Kerri M. Raissian

Review of Economics of the Household (2021) | Cite this article

Schneider, Bullinger, & Raissian (2021)

$1 increase in MW reduces spanking by 22%

	Maternal spanking[a]			
	(1) Year 3	(2) Year 5	(3) Year 9	(4) City FE[a,b]
Minimum wage ($2016)	−0.079*** (0.021)	−0.003 (0.021)	−0.029 (0.025)	−0.012 (0.04)
Lagged outcome in year 1	0.299*** (0.029)	0.072* (0.030)	0.010 (0.030)	
Lagged outcome in year 3		0.364*** (0.027)	0.126*** (0.031)	
Lagged outcome in year 5			0.194*** (0.030)	
Lagged outcome (pooled)				0.302*** (0.017)
Age 5				−0.274 (0.216)
Age 9				0.132 (0.426)
Age 5 × min wage				0.048 (0.035)
Age 9 × min wage				0.043 (0.033)
R^2	0.1217	0.1960	0.1010	0.1261
Mean Y	0.55	0.5	0.51	0.47
N		1347		4041

Schneider, Bullinger, & Raissian (2021)

	Physical aggression[a]			Psychological aggression[a]		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Year 5	Year 9	City FE[a,c]	Year 5	Year 9	City FE[a,c]
Minimum wage ($2016)	−0.38 (0.057)	−0.222** (0.083)	0.148* (0.060)	0.059 (0.039)	−0.157** (0.054)	0.187*** (0.043)
Lagged outcome in year 3	0.075*** (0.004)	0.033*** (0.009)		0.058*** (0.004)	0.030*** (0.006)	
Lagged outcome in year 5		0.072*** (0.008)			0.051*** (0.006)	
Lagged outcome (pooled)			−0.049*** (0.002)	0.080***		−0.042*** (0.002)
Age 5						
Age 9			1.146** (0.422)			0.326 (0.306)
Age 5 × min wage						
Age 9 × min wage			−0.271*** (0.053)			−0.206*** (0.036)
R^2	0.170	0.1831	0.1987	0.1270	0.1706	0.1499
Mean Y	1.29	1.67	1.57	8.44	9.21	8.35
N	805		1610	886		1772

$1 increase in MW reduces physical aggression by 27%

Schneider, Bullinger, & Raissian (2021)

	Physical aggression[a]			Psychological aggression[a]		
	(1) Year 5	(2) Year 9	(3) City FE[a,c]	(4) Year 5	(5) Year 9	(6) City FE[a,c]
Minimum wage ($2016)	−0.38 (0.057)	−0.222** (0.083)	0.148* (0.060)	0.059 (0.039)	−0.157** (0.054)	0.187*** (0.043)
Lagged outcome in year 3	0.075*** (0.004)	0.033*** (0.009)		0.058*** (0.004)	0.030*** (0.006)	
Lagged outcome in year 5		0.072*** (0.008)			0.051*** (0.006)	
Lagged outcome (pooled)			−0.049*** (0.002)	0.080***		−0.042*** (0.002)
Age 5						
Age 9			1.146** (0.422)			0.326 (0.306)
Age 5 × min wage						
Age 9 × min wage			−0.271*** (0.053)			−0.206*** (0.036)
R^2	0.170	0.1831	0.1987	0.1270	0.1706	0.1499
Mean Y	1.29	1.67	1.57	8.44	9.21	8.35
N	805		1610	886		1772

$1 increase in MW reduces psychological aggression by 21%

Schneider, Bullinger, & Raissian (2021)

$1 increase in MW reduces maternal employment by 6.5%

	Maternal employment[a]			
	(1) Year 3	(2) Year 5	(3) Year 9	(4) City FE[b]
Minimum wage ($2016)	−0.02 (0.022)	−0.036* (0.019)	−0.018 (0.027)	−0.252 (0.032)
Lagged outcome in year 1	0.321*** (0.024)	0.205*** (0.025)	0.127*** (0.030)	
Lagged outcome in year 3		0.274*** (0.024)	0.163*** (0.030)	
Lagged outcome in year 5			0.227*** (0.025)	
Lagged outcome (pooled)				0.324*** (0.015)
Age 5				0.409* (0.200)
Age 9				0.053 (0.391)
Age 5 × min wage				−0.075* (0.031)
Age 9 × min wage				−0.028 (0.029)
R^2	0.1218	0.1752	0.1733	0.1289
Mean Y	0.52	0.55	0.51	0.54
N		1436		

Schneider, Bullinger, & Raissian (2021)

$1 increase in MW reduces working weekend shifts by 70%

Sometimes work evening shift[a]				Sometimes work weekend shift[a]			
(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)
Year 3	Year 5	Year 9	City FE[b]	Year 3	Year 5	Year 9	City FE[b]
−0.003	−0.017	−0.016	−0.025	0.038*	−0.036*	0.015	0.026 (0.026)
(0.023)	(0.025)	(0.029)	(0.039)	(0.019)	(0.016)	(0.019)	
0.098**	0.101*	0.017		0.074*	0.152***	0.019	
(0.035)	(0.049)	(0.042)		(0.034)	(0.043)	(0.036)	
	0.003	0.044			0.032 (0.034)	0.024	
	(0.036)	(0.047)				(0.034)	
		0.033				0.021	
		(0.040)				(0.029)	
			0.083***				0.087***
			(0.021)				(0.018)
			0.269 (0.235)				0.583***
							(0.157)
			0.507 (0.486)				0.279 (0.309)
			−0.053				−0.100***
			(0.037)				(0.025)
			−0.048				−0.027 (0.024)
			(0.034)				
0.0642	0.0603	0.0522	0.0358	0.0307	0.0531	0.0346	0.031
0.1	0.09	0.09	0.11	0.11	0.1	0.08	0.12
	657				922		

Feely, Raissian, Schneider, & Bullinger (2020)

Time & Money



CONCLUSIONS

CONCLUSIONS

1. Neglect remains intractable.

2. Policies that address the underlying social & economic problems contributing to poverty offer promise.

3. Likely because they target the macro-level environment that may lead to neglect.

Thank you!

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